Regulating international finance and the evolving imbalance of capitalisms since the 1970s

In this paper, I put the ongoing G20 process of improving the regulation of international finance into a historically informed perspective. To understand the driving forces behind and obstacles to international cooperation in governing finance I combine concepts from international political economy and comparative political economy (IPE and CPE) that have previously been only loosely connected. Building on the IPE literature that highlights the historical and political embeddedness of financial regulation I depart from the IPE focus on the globalization of US-UK financial market capitalism. CPE studies show that, since the 1970s, different variations of capitalism have reacted in distinct ways to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, lower growth rates and saturated domestic markets. Most notably, there has been a divergence between the approaches of financializing countries (US, UK) and export-oriented countries (Germany, East Asian nations). The interdependence between financialized and export-oriented variations of capitalism has contributed to the dynamics and crises of international finance for the past four decades. This 'imbalance of capitalisms' also became an obstacle to international cooperation in regulating finance. Faced with the 'trilemma of economic policies,' the financialized and export-oriented variants of capitalism have chosen different combinations of macroeconomic policies, currency policies, and the regulation of financial flows and financial firms. This divergence has led to conflicting preferences with regard to international cooperation to regulate finance. -- Dieses Papier betrachtet die historischen Hintergründe der Schwierigkeiten und Konflikte bei der (Re-)regulierung der internationalen Finanzbeziehungen in der G20. Diese Konflikte lassen sich besonders gut bei dem Versuch der Koordinierung von Fiskal- und Geldpolitik, der Regulierung von Banken und Finanzströmen sowie der Reduzierung globaler wirtschaftlicher Ungleichgewichte beobachten. Hierzu werden bisher nur unzureichend verbundene Ansätze aus der Internationalen und der Vergleichenden Politischen Ökonomie (IPÖ/VPÖ) kombiniert. Die IPÖ-inspirierte Betrachtung internationaler Kooperation verbunden mit dem VPÖ-inspirierten Fokus auf die pfadabhängig unterschiedlichen Spielarten des Kapitalismus ermöglicht ein besseres Verständnis der Hintergründe von Konflikten bei der Regulierung internationaler Finanzbeziehungen. Besonders berücksichtigt werden hierbei die unterschiedlichen Entwicklungen verschiedener Spielarten des Kapitalismus seit dem Zusammenbruch des Bretton-Woods-Systems Anfang der 1970er-Jahre. Die Interdependenz von finanzmarktorientiertem Kapitalismus in den Vereinigten Staaten und Großbritannien sowie exportorientierter Kapitalismusvarianten in Europa und Ostasien haben die internationalen Finanzbeziehungen in den letzten vier Jahrzehnten entscheidend geprägt. Beide Modelle unterscheiden sich ganz erheblich bezüglich der institutionellen Arrangements bei der Regulierung von Finanzbeziehungen und der Fiskal-, Geld- und Währungspolitik. Diese Unterschiede wiederum führen zu divergierenden Präferenzen und Konflikten bei der internationalen Koordinierung der Regulierung von Finanzbeziehungen.

Zero forcing in iterated line digraphs

Zero forcing is a propagation process on a graph, or digraph, defined in linear algebra to provide a bound for the minimum rank problem. Independently, zero forcing was introduced in physics, computer science and network science, areas where line digraphs are frequently used as models. Zero forcing is also related to power domination, a propagation process that models the monitoring of electrical power networks. In this paper we study zero forcing in iterated line digraphs and provide a relationship between zero forcing and power domination in line digraphs. In particular, for regular iterated line digraphs we determine the minimum rank/maximum nullity, zero forcing number and power domination number, and provide constructions to attain them. We conclude that regular iterated line digraphs present optimal minimum rank/maximum nullity, zero forcing number and power domination number, and apply our results to determine those parameters on some families of digraphs often used in applications

Maximal antichains of minimum size

Let $n\geqslant 4$ be a natural number, and let $K$ be a set $K\subseteq [n]:={1,2,...,n}$. We study the problem to find the smallest possible size of a maximal family $\mathcal{A}$ of subsets of $[n]$ such that $\mathcal{A}$ contains only sets whose size is in $K$, and $A\not\subseteq B$ for all ${A,B}\subseteq\mathcal{A}$, i.e. $\mathcal{A}$ is an antichain. We present a general construction of such antichains for sets $K$ containing 2, but not 1. If $3\in K$ our construction asymptotically yields the smallest possible size of such a family, up to an $o(n^2)$ error. We conjecture our construction to be asymptotically optimal also for $3\not\in K$, and we prove a weaker bound for the case $K={2,4}$. Our asymptotic results are straightforward applications of the graph removal lemma to an equivalent reformulation of the problem in extremal graph theory which is interesting in its own right.Comment: fixed faulty argument in Section 2, added reference

Regulating international finance and the evolving imbalance of capitalisms since the 1970s

In this paper, I put the ongoing G20 process of improving the regulation of international finance into a historically informed perspective. To understand the driving forces behind and obstacles to international cooperation in governing finance I combine concepts from international political economy and comparative political economy (IPE and CPE) that have previously been only loosely connected. Building on the IPE literature that highlights the historical and political embeddedness of financial regulation I depart from the IPE focus on the globalization of US–UK financial market capitalism. CPE studies show that, since the 1970s, different variations of capitalism have reacted in distinct ways to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, lower growth rates and saturated domestic markets. Most notably, there has been a divergence between the approaches of financializing countries (US, UK) and export-oriented countries (Germany, East Asian nations). The interdependence between financialized and export-oriented variations of capitalism has contributed to the dynamics and crises of international finance for the past four decades. This “imbalance of capitalisms” also became an obstacle to international cooperation in regulating finance. Faced with the “trilemma of economic policies,” the financialized and export-oriented variants of capitalism have chosen different combinations of macroeconomic policies, currency policies, and the regulation of financial flows and financial firms. This divergence has led to conflicting preferences with regard to international cooperation to regulate finance. Dieses Papier betrachtet die historischen Hintergründe der Schwierigkeiten und Konflikte bei der (Re-)regulierung der internationalen Finanzbeziehungen in der G20. Diese Konflikte lassen sich besonders gut bei dem Versuch der Koordinierung von Fiskal- und Geldpolitik, der Regulierung von Banken und Finanzströmen sowie der Reduzierung globaler wirtschaftlicher Ungleichgewichte beobachten. Hierzu werden bisher nur unzureichend verbundene Ansätze aus der Internationalen und der Vergleichenden Politischen Ökonomie (IPÖ/VPÖ) kombiniert. Die IPÖ-inspirierte Betrachtung internationaler Kooperation verbunden mit dem VPÖ-inspirierten Fokus auf die pfadabhängig unterschiedlichen Spielarten des Kapitalismus ermöglicht ein besseres Verständnis der Hintergründe von Konflikten bei der Regulierung internationaler Finanzbeziehungen. Besonders berücksichtigt werden hierbei die unterschiedlichen Entwicklungen verschiedener Spielarten des Kapitalismus seit dem Zusammenbruch des Bretton-Woods-Systems Anfang der 1970er-Jahre. Die Interdependenz von finanzmarktorientiertem Kapitalismus in den Vereinigten Staaten und Großbritannien sowie exportorientierter Kapitalismusvarianten in Europa und Ostasien haben die internationalen Finanzbeziehungen in den letzten vier Jahrzehnten entscheidend geprägt. Beide Modelle unterscheiden sich ganz erheblich bezüglich der institutionellen Arrangements bei der Regulierung von Finanzbeziehungen und der Fiskal-, Geld- und Währungspolitik. Diese Unterschiede wiederum führen zu divergierenden Präferenzen und Konflikten bei der internationalen Koordinierung der Regulierung von Finanzbeziehungen.1 Introduction 2 The imbalance of capitalisms and the dilemmas of international financial regulation The imbalance of capitalisms since the 1970s The trilemma of economic policy 3 Financialization of capitalism in the US and the UK 4 Export-oriented capitalism in Europe and East Asia 5 Conclusions Reference

Scheduling unit processing time arc shutdown jobs to maximize network flow over time: complexity results

We study the problem of scheduling maintenance on arcs of a capacitated network so as to maximize the total flow from a source node to a sink node over a set of time periods. Maintenance on an arc shuts down the arc for the duration of the period in which its maintenance is scheduled, making its capacity zero for that period. A set of arcs is designated to have maintenance during the planning period, which will require each to be shut down for exactly one time period. In general this problem is known to be NP-hard. Here we identify a number of characteristics that are relevant for the complexity of instance classes. In particular, we discuss instances with restrictions on the set of arcs that have maintenance to be scheduled; series parallel networks; capacities that are balanced, in the sense that the total capacity of arcs entering a (non-terminal) node equals the total capacity of arcs leaving the node; and identical capacities on all arcs